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Cecchin: Doe v. Small, 964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992)
relied upon an independent analysis of the stereo sys17
tem involved.

CONCLUSION
In holding that the sound systems used by Claire's
fall within the home-type exemption, the Seventh
Circuit cautioned that congressional intent to limit the
exemption to a financially small establishment is
unclear. While finding the financial size of an establishment irrelevant to a definition of "small commercial establishment," the court concluded that physical
size is a factor to be considered when determining a
home-type system.1 8 In the court's view, the language
of the section 110(5) exemption is concerned with the
quantity and quality of the receiving equipment used,
not the financial status of the alleged infringing establishment.

Douglas W Michaud

12. The court looked to the statutory language *recieving
apparatus" and determined that by using the word "apparatus,"
which means "the totality of means by which a designated function
is performed...," congress meant the entire stereo system. Id. at
1493 (quotingAmerican Heritage Dictionary 120 (2d ed. 1982)).
13. 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (Defendant's stereo system included
dropped speakers and concealed wiring).
14. 949 F.2d at 1495.
15. Id. at 1491 (citing Conference Report at 75, 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5816).
16. Id.
17. See generally, Id. at 1492.
18. Physical size of the establishment is indictive of the
reach of the stereo system. The fact that a system audibly reaches
only a small area indicates a stereo system commonly used in
homes. Id. at 1494.

Doe v. Small,
964 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
The original plaintiff, Richard Rohrer, brought suit

1. Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Claire's Boutique, Inc., 949 F.2d
1482 (7th Cir. 1991).
2. Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. S 110(5) (1988).
3. Id. at S 110(5) provides:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying
a performance or display of a work by a the public reception of the transmission on a single
receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in
private homes, unless-(A) a direct charge is
made to see or hear the transmission; or (B) the
transmission thus received is further transmitted
to the public. 17 U.S.C. S 110(5).
4. Seegeneraltv, 949 F.2d at 1488-89.
5. A live musical performance before a substantial paying
audience is an obvious public performance. Id. at 1486.
6. Id. at 1489 (citing Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283
U.S. 191 (1931) (doctrine of multiple performance developed holding both a hotel and broadcasting station liable for infringement)).
7. Id. (citing Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artist Television,
Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968) (limiting the Jewel-LaSalle case to its facts
and finding broadcasting stations the public performer, but the
reciever and transmitting cable company a passive viewer);
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) (Held
chain restuarant playing radio music for its patrons is largely a passive act)).
8. The statute provides in pertinent part:
To "perform" a work means to recite, render,
play, dance, or act it, either directly or by means
of a device or process...
To perform or display a work "publicly" means...
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the
public or at any place where a substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a
family and its social acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of
any device or process, whether the members of
the public capable of receiving the performance
or display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times. 17 U.S.C. S 101 (1988).
9. 949 F.2d at 1489.
10. Id. at 1490.
11. In dicta the court stated that this would be a different
case if Claire's instructed all of their stores to broadcast identical
works or turn to the same radio station. Id.

34 by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
Published

against the defendants, the mayor of the City of
Ottawa, members of the City Council, and the City of

Ottawa, to enjoin the display of religious paintings in
a public park. The District Court granted the plaintiffs

motion for summary judgment, permanently barring
the display of the paintings in the park. On appeal,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed. However, after petition for a rehearing en banc, the appellate court reversed, holding that

the injunction was overbroad.
FACTS
In 1956, the Ottawa Retail Merchants Association,

a private organization, sponsored the production of
sixteen paintings which depicted the life of Jesus. The
paintings were displayed in Ottawa's Washington

Park during the Christmas season from 1957-1969 and
from 1980-1988. The City of Ottawa was involved in
the display of the paintings from 1964-1967; other-

wise, the artwork has been maintained by private
organizations. In 1980, the Ottawa Jaycees, a private
organization, took control of the paintings.
The paintings were displayed in Washington Park,
a public park. Even though the City of Ottawa maintains Washington Park, no city buildings are located
in or on the border of the park, and City Hall is
almost three blocks away. The City allows groups to
utilize the park on a first-come, first-served basis. The
park has been the site for assorted community and
private functions, including various religious activities,
such as church services, vigils and concerts. A sign

was erected in front of the paintings declaring the
Jaycees maintained the artwork without the use of
public funds.
In 1986, Mr. Rohrer wrote a letter to the Ottawa
City Council requesting the paintings be removed

from Washington Park because they "represent an
unacceptable endorsement of Christianity by the city
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and violate the constitutional rights of all Ottawans
who are not Christians."' On December 2, 1986, the
City Council then passed a resolution which endorsed
the Ottawa Jaycees' maintenance, erection, and dismantling and storing of the paintings. In support of
their endorsement, they found that the paintings
erected by the Jaycees were an integral part of community spirit and cooperation by both the private and
public sectors of Ottawa which, for the past twenty
years, had worked together to provide the city with
an appropriate yuletide spirit. In 1989, Jane Doe was
substituted as plaintiff, since Mr. Rohrer moved out of
Ottawa.
In granting summary judgment to the plaintiff, the
district court found a violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment and permanently
enjoined the display of the paintings in Washington
Park by any future party.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
The issue on appeal was whether private persons
could be enjoined from engaging in religious speech
in a public forum based on the content of the speech.
The plaintiff argued that the paintings in Washington
Park signified the City of Ottawa's endorsement of
Christianity and was in violation of the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment. The City of Ottawa
and the other defendants asserted that the paintings
represent private religious speech which is protected
by the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.
The appellate court concluded that the district
court's injunction was overbroad because its ruling
restrained the religious speech of all future parties.
There is a distinction between religious speech by private parties and that by the government. Private reli2
gious speech is protected by the Free Speech Clause.
The crucial difference is between government speech
endorsing religion, which is in violation of the
Establishment Clause, and private speech endorsing
religion, which is protected by the Free Speech and
Free Exercise Clauses. 5
The appellate court found that Washington Park
was a public forum. In public forums the government
is severely limited in restricting speech based on its
content.' In order for the government to restrict
speech in such a forum, the regulation must be necessary to serve a compelling government interest and
narrowly tailored to achieve that end.' The court held
that the Establishment Clause did not give the government a compelling interest in restricting, based on its
content, the religious speech of a private person in a
public forum.
The Constitution mandates that "religious speakers may not be discriminated against in a public
forum on the basis of their speech".6 However, the
mere presence of a religious symbol in a public
forum does not violate the Establishment Clause since
the government is not presumed to endorse every
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speaker it fails to censor.' This is consistent with the
U.S. Supreme Court's view that, in a public forum,
government may not discriminate against religious
speech in situations where non-religious speech
would be permitted. If the government opens a public forum to all, it cannot close it to religious speech.
Since Washington Park has historically been accessible to private groups, the City must give equal access
to private religious groups.
The court next addressed whether the district
court's remedy was narrowly tailored. A contentbased exclusion is permissible if it is narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest? In Widmar v.
Vincent, the U.S. Supreme court refused to find the
Establishment Clause a sufficiently compelling reason
to exclude private religious speech from a public
forum.1 Even if a compelling state interest could be
found, the remedy was not narrowly tailored because
it sought to prohibit the display of religious paintings
by any party, present or future, rather than enjoin the
City's alleged endorsement of the paintings.
A court's remedy should be fashioned in such a
manner as not to infringe the Free Speech rights of
the private party." If, as the plaintiff alleged, there
was an appearance of governmental endorsement of
the religious speech, the government could take steps
to remove the indicia of that endorsement. The court
suggested the City Council could withdraw its
endorsement of the displays or erect a more visible
sign in front of the displays, specifically stating the
City's disclaimer of endorsement of the religious
speech. The City must treat all expression in the park
equally, and not exclude private persons from
Washington Park merely because of their religious
speech.
In their concurrences, both Justice Cudahy and
Justice Flaum focused on the appellate court's refusal
to address the issue of whether the City did in fact
endorse the Jaycees' religious expression. Justice
Cudahy proffered that a violation of the Establishment
Clause had occurred since the effect of the displays
was an appearance of city endorsement. Justice Flaum
asserted that the history of the City's endorsement of
Christianity suggests that the appropriate remedy
would seek to eliminate such past endorsement.
Using a different approach, Justice Easterbrook's concurrence found that religious speech can never be
excluded from public forums simply because private
persons wrongly infer government endorsement of
free speech.
CONCLUSION
The Seventh Circuit held that no conflict exists
between the Free Speech and the Establishment
Clause if private persons engage in religious speech
in a public forum. The City can impose content-neutral restrictions, but cannot engage in a content-based
restriction since the Constitution mandates that reli2

